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ON REMEMBERING JUDGE EUGENE P.
SPELLMAN: A DIFFERENT VISION
IRA J. KURZBANt
IRWIN P. STOTZKYT
Celebrations of important community leaders, particularly those
who have stood for moral accountability by government authorities, are
curious events. They are a strange mixture of sadness and joy, and that
is especially true for both of us as we honor the memory of Judge Eugene
P. Spellman. Indeed, we make these claims on an emotional as well as
intellectual level, based on our unique experiences with him in the seem-
ingly never-ending litigation encapsulated in the case of Jean v. Nelson.'
The uniqueness of our relationship with Judge Spelman evolves
from the fact that Jean confronted a field of law - immigration law -
that has long evaded the most basic requirements of civilized decency.
No other area of American law has been so radically insulated and diver-
gent from those fundamental norms of constitutional law, administrative
procedure, and judicial role that define the remainder of our legal system.
In the midst of legal revolutions in due process and equal protection doc-
trine and conceptions of judicial role, immigration law continues to
maintain its stubborn adherence to absolute government authority.
The distinctiveness of immigration law reflects a variety of factors.
From the beginning of the ideal of nationhood, a country's power to de-
cide who may enter and remain in its domain, under what conditions and
with what legal conequences, has been viewed as an essential precondi-
tion of sovereignty. Moreover, immigration law often implicates the na-
tion's basic foreign policy objectives, thereby pressuring courts to be less
scrupulous in safeguarding constitutional values and more deferential to
t Partner, Kurzban, Kurzban & Weinger P.A., Miami, Florida; Past President, American
Immigration Lawyers Association.
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Mr. Kurzban and Professor Stotzky have been an integral part of a team of lawyers that have
represented Haitian refugees for the past fifteen years in a series of path breaking lawsuits. Since
1985 they have represented Haitian refugees in front of the United States Supreme Court on four
separate occasions. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154 (1990); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Baker, 60 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992).
A major purpose of the lawsuits is to make the government adhere to the rule of law by forcing
the INS to restructure its illegal practices so that they conform to constitutional requirements.
1. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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Executive and Congressional mandates. Further, the domestic politics of
immigration, and thus the law governing aliens, are unusual. Even law-
fully admitted aliens do not have the right to vote, and millions of un-
documented workers live outside the protection of the law. For
complicated psychological reasons, many Americans view immigrants
with suspicion and even hostility.2 Refugees are a constant reminder of
the uncertainty and randomness of life. Indeed, during periods of eco-
nomic, political, and social crisis, aliens become the targets for racial and
religious bigotry, releasing forces that have a profound impact on the
character of immigration policies and laws.
The 1980's, however, witnessed a resurgence of interest in attacking
this skewed vision of immigration law. Civil rights lawyers filed a variety
of lawsuits in an attempt to employ the remedies of injunctive relief and
class actions to obtain structural reform of government institutional
practices so that they reflect our constitutional norms. Much of the
power of this attack is attributable to events which tested the limits of
immigration law in unprecedented ways. The influx of approximately
125,000 Cubans in the 1981 Mariel boatlift, the thousands of Haitians
fleeing the Duvalier regime and, most recently, the military coup that
ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected President
of Haiti in 200 years, are the sources for this legal attack.
More importantly, however, these cases forced federal judges to take
a moral stand against a wide array of blatantly illegal government ac-
tions, thus helping to create a moral consciousness in the citizenry.
Judge Spellman led the way. The most prominent case arising out of
these developments is Jean, a 1985 decision of the United States Supreme
Court that captures much of what is significant about the immigration
law cases of the past decade. Jean involved the influx of Haitians into
South Florida during the early 1980's, most of whom sought political
asylum. The government adopted a general practice of incarcerating
these Haitians in "camps" pending a determination of their asylum
claims, and did not grant their requests to be released temporarily on
"parole." In so doing, the government violated several statutes by not
meeting fundamental procedural norms, such as the basic notice and
comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).
Under our law, any alien, regardless of race or nationality, has a
statutory, regulatory and treaty right to seek asylum if he has a well-
founded fear of persecution, or if his life or freedom would be threatened
if returned to his country of origin. Excludable aliens, those who seek
2. Indeed, even the use of the term "alien" implies a stranger of whom one should be wary.
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admission but have not been granted entry into the United States, such as
these Haitian refugees, are accorded these rights whether they arrive at
our shores by boat or by other means. The process for determining asy-
lum claims is complex and often takes many months.
Although Congress permitted the Attorney General to incarcerate
aliens on a non-discriminatory basis pending the determination of an
alien's claim, the statute does not require incarceration. Indeed, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials did not read the stat-
utes to require incarceration from 1954 until 1981. Moreover, Congress
specifically provided that excludable aliens could be paroled pending a
determination of their admissibility. Prior to 1981, the government rou-
tinely paroled excludable aliens seeking asylum regardless of race or
nationality.
In 1981, however, the INS continuously refused to apply Congress'
intent to permit temporary release pending a determination of admissibil-
ity to black Haitian refugees. Nevertheless, it continued to permit such
parole for all other refugees, including asylum seekers entering Florida
from Cuba and Nicaragua. The Haitian refugees fied suit alleging, inter
alia, that this detention policy denied them equal protection and other
constitutional and statutory guarantees because it discriminated against
them solely on the basis of their national origin and race. Indeed, no
other group had ever been incarcerated in this way.3 In 1982, in the face
of hostile public reaction and intense government pressure, the Haitians
obtained an injunction from Judge Spellman releasing them from incar-
ceration. The injunction further required INS to establish and follow
rules and regulations which met APA notice and comment requirements,
but the case nevertheless continued to wind its way through the courts on
a variety of issues for approximately ten years.
The Supreme Court eventually ruled that any discrimination against
the Haitians based on race or national origin would be unlawful under
the applicable immigration statutes and government regulations. But the
3. The closest case in American history is the shameless decision in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where, despite the clear violation of personal liberty, the Supreme Court
upheld the War Department's program, enacted following Pearl Harbor, of exclusion, detention and
physical relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry residing in an extended area in the western
United States. The program did not restrict itself to enemy aliens, but instead included American
citizens of Japanese ancestry who resided in the particular area determined by the military to be off
limits. The government justified the program as a means essential to protect against espionage and
sabotage during this period of World War II. Thus, on the grounds of military necessity, the
Supreme Court upheld a discriminatory racial classification. This is the only instance in which the
Supreme Court has ever upheld an explicit racial discrimination after applying strict scrutiny. The
case has been widely described as an immoral blot on our constitutional conscience. It is an example
of the impact that racism and war may have on our institutional health and national integrity. It can
safely be stated that Korematsu has been overruled by the courts of history.
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Court did not reach the constitutional issues. In response to this litiga-
tion and the loud public outcry that it produced, Congress eventually
enacted new legislation to deal with these tragic circumstances. These
laws allowed all Haitian refugees who had reached our shores prior to
1982 to apply for resident status and eventually citizenship. Virtually all
of these Haitians are now living productive lives in the United States, and
many are applying for citizenship.4 These changes in public attitude and
in the law can be attributed directly to Judge Spellman's opinions in
Jean. They provided the impetus for change.
Because of Jean, we lived with Judge Spellman and his decisions
(and he with us) for approximately ten years, as the case continuously
wound its way back to him after a dizzying, complicated series of circui-
tous appeals that twice reached the United States Supreme Court, and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals almost too many times to recall.5
During the frenzied days of pre-trial, trial and post-trial emergencies,
when the pressure was most intense, we appreciated and greatly enjoyed
Judge Spellman's humor and empathy for all of the parties, including the
lawyers for both the government and the Haitians. He always had the
perfect comment, the correct stare, or the precisely worded written order
that seemed to relieve the almost solid-like tension between the opposing
attorneys.
This is not to say, of course, that we necessarily agreed with all of
his rulings. Quite the contrary. We often vehemently disagreed with his
conclusions and the reasoning he used in reaching them. During the
course of battle, we even became angry at Judge Spellman because of
some of his rulings. One could not, however, remain angry with him for
long. His personal and professional integrity and the intellectual rigor
with which he confronted his tasks were beyond reproach. They became
more apparent as the years passed. These attributes seem especially sig-
nificant today, when much of the population, and particularly the bar,
4. In October 1981, in addition to its new detention policy applied only to Haitian refugees,
the Reagan Administration also adopted a program of Coast Guard interdiction of boats in waters
between Haiti and the United States. Through this interdiction policy, the government clearly
meant to cut down on the number of asylum seekers. In November 1991, Haitian refugees filed
another lawsuit claiming illegalities in the implementation of this policy. See Haitian Refugee
Center v. Baker, 60 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992). After a harrowing litigation that produced
numerous appeals, the Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a stay and its petition for
certiorari. Thousands of Haitians have thus been repatriated and face persecution in Haiti. This is
another tragic instance in which the Supreme Court has failed to live up to its constitutional man-
date. In our opinion, it is akin to the Court's decision in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
5. Indeed, several government attorneys claim that the government appealed the district court
decisions in Jean more times than any case ever reported in the federal reporters. We have never
had the opportunity to verify this information. Nevertheless, we can attest to the fact that there
were an incredible number of such appeals.
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feels so alienated from the historic function played by the federal courts
in perpetuating a highly moral body of learning known as constitutional
law.
Lawyers who came of age in previous generations, including both of
us, saw the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the circuit and
district courts, as institutions worthy of our highest respect, admiration,
and support. Presently, however, federal courts are often seen as hostile
and uncommitted to our most prized national ideals of equality and jus-
tice under the law. They are increasingly seen as institutions dedicated
to protecting the "established order" and increasing the power of those
who serve it, such as officials of the Executive Branch.
It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to say that Judge Spellman was
a judge who possessed qualities that have long since gone out of style, but
which, we believe, are integrally related to the fragile art of judging and
to the pursuit of substantive justice. We will never forget him for these
qualities, and we hope to emulate him in our practice, teaching, and writ-
ing. We rejoice, therefore, in Judge Spellman's memory and feel the
pleasure of his work, but, at the same time, we feel sadness, not just for
his family, friends, fellow judges and other colleagues, but even more for
the law. His death jeopardizes the positive achievements of the federal
courts in profound ways, for he represents the best ideals of an institution
that created the impetus for the most significant changes in the history
of the republic, including, not least of all, the quest for racial equality.
It is perhaps easier to understand our views about him if we set the
context for our conclusions. On many significant levels - intellectual,
political, and social - we came of age in our conceptions of the role the
judiciary should play in our society in the 1960's and early to mid-1970's.
This was, of course, during the hey-day of the Warren Court, a remarka-
ble era of Supreme Court history that can be said to have started with
Brown v. Board of Education 6 in the mid-1950's, and reached its most
dazzling heights during the early to mid-1960's when the progressive
wing of the Court achieved a strong majority. This was the "golden age"
of American law, the era of Justices Warren, Black, Brennan, Douglas,
Fortas, Goldberg and Marshall, among others. Although Chief Justice
Earl Warren retired in 1969, this extraordinary phase of legal history
that bears his name continued into the early 1970's.
The foundations of the Warren Court jurisprudence had its anteced-
ents in earlier Supreme Court periods. Most particularly, these founda-
tions are reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1930's.
During this period, the Court took the dissents written by Justices
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Holmes and Brandeis and turned them into majority positions, thus ele-
vating the principle of freedom of speech into a significant set of values of
American society.7 Simultaneously, the Court began to intervene in
criminal proceedings to assure a minimum level of procedural fairness.
Even with these roots as background, however, the Warren Court
represented an almost completely new experiment in judicial decision-
making. There was clearly something unique, distinctive, and special
about that Court. Brown, for example, undertook the most daunting of
all constitutional jobs: making America's historic promise of racial equal-
ity in all aspects of political and social life a reality. But Brown stood for
even more than this incredible challenge. It stood for a set of commit-
ments and a vision of law that grew into a program of wide-ranging con-
stitutional reform. In pursuit of this vision, the Warren Court used the
Civil War Amendments and the Bill of Rights as the standard for judg-
ing the accepted, established order. By so doing, it changed the entire
range of relationships between the federal and state governments, as well
as the relationships between the citizen and the state and federal govern-
ments. The Warren Court nationalized a set of rights reflected in these
amendments. No longer could a man charged with a crime in State A be
given virtually no procedural protections or be treated with less proce-
dural protections than one charged with the same crime in State B. Both
now had to be treated with an equivalent minimum of procedural
protections.
This was, of course, a profound change from the 1950's. During
that era, America was not a nation that stood for the highest ideals in its
treatment of the people by the government. In point of fact, America
was a dreadful place. State governments systematically disenfranchised
blacks and even excluded them from serving on juries. State legislatures
were starkly malapportioned and gerrymandered. McCarthyism was at
its height. The government stifled any attempt at so-called "radical"
speech - any speech which challenged the status quo. State govern-
ments censored what they considered to be libelous or obscene speech
without any constitutional limits to their repression.
The legal system treated other aspects of public and private life even
more harshly. Law impinged upon the most intimate of human relation-
ships; it barred the public dissemination of any information concerning
contraceptives. Moreover, the states had a free and unbridled reign on
the administration of justice in criminal matters. Courts often upheld
convictions based solely on illegally seized evidence or on statements
7. It was not until this period that the Supreme Court began to create and take seriously the
tradition of protecting seditious libel as the central meaning of the First Amendment.
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physically or psychologically coerced from the accused. Trials often
took place without counsel or even juries. No legal barriers existed for
limiting the imposition of the death penalty. This was not all. Govern-
ment administered the welfare system in an arbitrary, capricious, and
sometimes oppressive manner. Economic restrictions, such as poll taxes,
directly harmed the ability of the poor to engage in public, civic activities
enjoyed by the more affluent. All of these practices, of course, dispropor-
tionally affected the poor and otherwise disadvantaged.
These were only some of the extremely difficult challenges faced by
the Warren Court. The Court not only spoke to these issues, but at-
tacked them systematically and, by and large, successfully. In dealing
with these matters, the Court acted with the strong support of many im-
portant sectors of society, such as the civil rights and welfare rights
movements. It did not, and could not, act without such political and
social support. Law reflects and is reflected in social movements. In-
deed, the federal courts often looked to the executive and legislative
branches for support during the most critical times of change.
The rigidly segregated dual school system, for example, could not
have been dismantled without the use of federal troops, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the lawsuits of the NAACP, intervention of the Department
of Justice and other government agencies, or the incredibly brave black
citizens, fully cognizant that their lives were on the line, who became
plaintiffs or marched and demonstrated to break the Jim Crow system
and to obtain their rights. Without the committed, enthusiastic involve-
ment of all of these participants, the positive changes in public and pri-
vate life for all of the American people could never have taken place in
the 1960's. But, in our opinion, it was the Warren Court and the lower
federal courts of that era which acted as a catalyst for these bold reforms.
The federal courts inspired and protected the people who sought to im-
plement those changes. To put it another way, constitutional and statu-
tory law became both an object as well as a subject. Employing that law,
the federal judiciary created a centrifugal force for change, and was itself
inspired and empowered by those political and social changes.
A constitutional program of such a revolutionary nature is, of
course, the work of many hearts and minds. The Warren Court and the
lower federal courts not only had fine theoreticians, but also had first rate
technicians; lawyers who possessed not only the vision for change, but
also those who had a mastery of the legal craft. Moreover, academics
provided important theoretical and interpretive positions which aided the
Supreme Court in its task.
Perhaps of even more significance, lower federal court judges
brought to bear their visions, skills, and talents in addressing constitu-
1992]
ST THOMAS LAW REVIEW
tional claims in the first instance. These judges also faced the almost
impossible task of implementing the changes as the Supreme Court began
to articulate them at an almost non-stop, dizzying speed. So the lower
courts had to be creative in first suggesting theories and applying them to
constitutional guarantees and statutes, and then had to implement the
new changes suggested by the Supreme Court. Because of these revolu-
tionary changes, federal circuit and district court judges faced another
significant, almost overbearing burden. They faced the outright hostility,
social ostracism, and distinct possibility of violence against them and
their families by some members of the communities within which they
lived. In general, they took the high road and the heat of the commu-
nity. They followed and lead simultaneously. All in all, it was a stun-
ning performance.
A constitutional program that was so revolutionary, however, is cer-
tain to face powerful opposition. Indeed, in our opinion, the counter-
assault began in the early 1960's. By the late 1960's, the battle was on.
In 1968, Richard Nixon ran against the entire federal judiciary, particu-
larly the Warren Court and its noble view of law. Prior to this time, Earl
Warren tendered his resignation to President Johnson in an effort to have
Johnson's choice, Abe Fortas, replace him as leader of the Court. But
Fortas' nomination was withdrawn when the Senate refused to confirm
him, and later, due to financial improprieties, he was forced to resign
altogether. Following the 1968 election, Nixon appointed Warren Bur-
ger to replace Earl Warren as chief justice. In short order, John Harlan
and Hugo Black resigned. President Nixon found himself with the op-
portunity to make three appointments during his first term in office.
Over time, only one of those appointments, Harry A. Blackmun, grew
into a justice whose constitutional vision could be said to be compatible
with that of the Warren Court. The other two appointments, Lewis
Powell and William Rehnquist, were clearly at odds with the Warren
Court's jurisprudence of the sixties.
The final dissolution of the Warren Court came in 1975, with the
resignation of William 0. Douglas and his replacement by John Paul
Stevens. Moreover, two significant accidents of history occurred which
secured this shift in power: President Carter did not have an opportunity
to make any appointments to the Court (a distinction he shared with no
other president in our history who completed a full term), while Presi-
dent Reagan had the opportunity to fill three vacancies during his term
in office. He appointed Antonin Scalia to replace Justice Burger, Sandra
Day O'Connor to replace Justice Stewart, and Anthony Kennedy to re-
place Justice Powell. In 1986, President Reagan elevated Rehnquist to
the position of chief justice. Rehnquist, who actually lead the Court in-
[Vol. 4:5
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tellectually and politically during the seventies and eighties in its
counter-assault to the Warren Court's jurisprudence, finally assumed the
outward mantel of leadership.
8
These changes led to an entirely new era of Supreme Court history.
The gutting of the Warren Court's jurisprudence started with an attack
on Brown and its progeny. Although the Court did not expressly over-
rule Brown, it ruled that it is constitutional for a school system to contain
a large number of all-black and all-white schools. To put it another way,
the Rehnquist Court has shifted the emphasis of Brown and, in so doing,
severely limited the nature of the remedy. As a result, Brown lost much
of its strength, energy, and moral power.
Moreover, the egalitarianism of the Warren Court outside of the
school desegregation context has been barred by new and revised inter-
pretations of the Equal Protection Clause. For example, the Court has
drawn a sharp distinction between state and society, confining the ban on
racial discrimination to a very narrowly understood concept of state ac-
tion. Furthermore, the Court has held that to establish an equal protec-
tion claim it is not enough to show that state action has a disparate
impact on and thus especially disadvantages minorities; rather, a propo-
nent of the claim must also show that the state intends to have such an
effect.
The Rehnquist Court has gone even further. In the mid-1970's, the
Court removed the poor from the protection of the Equal Protection
Clause, and declared that education was not a fundamental right. Ac-
tions such as this, of course, brought to an abrupt stop the Court's pro-
cess of enumerating rights that would warrant special consideration
under the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, the Court diluted the
requirement of strict numerical equality in the apportionment area.
Thus, departures from the "one person one vote" standard have become
constitutionally acceptable.
In other areas, such as freedom of speech and criminal law issues,
the Rehnquist Court created new power for the state and certain private
interests. The Court's strong commitment to what Justice Brennan
called "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, for example, has
been severely cut back and even gutted. The Rehnquist Court has up-
held laws denying politically active groups and individuals the opportu-
nity to reach audiences at the only places where they may be reached,
such as at shopping centers and in front of particular government build-
ings. The Court has even sanctioned laws banning demonstrations at
8. President Bush completed the changes with the appointments of David Souter to replace
Justice Brennan and Clarence Thomas to replace Justice Marshall.
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public parks and the like. But, on the other hand, the Court has struck
down as violative of the First Amendment a number of laws attempting
to limit political expenditures as a means of preventing the wealthy from
drowning out the voices of the poor.
In the criminal context, the Warren Court precedents have fared no
better. The Rehnquist Court has shifted the balance of advantage in the
criminal process strongly to the state. For example, restrictions on the
investigatory powers of the police have been almost totally removed.
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures and Fifth Amendment bars to self-incrimination have been nar-
rowly construed. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has also been
severely compromised. The ban on the death penalty, which had its
roots in the 1960's and its formal effect in the 1970's, has essentially been
removed. Moreover, Rehnquist, both as Chief Justice and as head of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, has attempted to institute a
series of procedural reforms which expedite that process. To a large ex-
tent, he has succeeded. Since 1976, approximately 169 convicted persons
have been executed.
These changes, of course, are only a sample of the success that the
Rehnquist Court has had in destroying the vision and jurisprudence of
the Warren Court. For many members of the profession, both in prac-
tice and in the academy, disaffection from the federal judiciary runs deep.
Under such conditions, therefore, it is very difficult to pay respect to and
admire the present body of constitutional law. It is difficult to see how
the federal courts can continue to speak authoritatively to the burning
issues that divide us, and to attempt to ameliorate the great tensions in
our society, when many feel so alienated from them. Yet, for the most
optimistic of us, it is always possible to believe that the federal courts will
once again become a source of moral authority and hope. Can we create
a new vision of what might be by looking at what was and what is?
In thinking about this predicament, we often think of Judge Spell-
man. While he means many things to us, one of the most important
aspects of his public life, which touches us deeply and pushes the cyni-
cism away, is his loyalty to the federal courts as an institution. As a
judge, he resisted these cynical views of constitutional law tenaciously; he
always remained faithful to the prospect of achieving justice even within
the confines of this dilemma. His achievements speak for the correctness
of his views. His faith is the torch which helps sustain us during these
dark times.
There are, of course, other qualities of heart and mind which Judge
Spellman had, and which inspire us to continue to use law as both an end
in itself and as an instrument for achieving justice. Judge Spellman's
[Vol. 4:5
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contribution to the federal courts and the search for substantive justice
had many levels. He was devoted to the values we identify with freedom,
liberty, and autonomy - equality, procedural fairness, freedom of
speech and the like - and he was prepared to protect and perpetuate
these values by acting on them. Moreover, Judge Spellman was thor-
oughly devoted to the federal courts as an institution - as a co-equal
branch of government. His opinions reflected a set of skills which invari-
ably declared principles and attested to the details that constitute the law
in a manner that was meant to strengthen the courts in the eyes of the
public and the profession alike. To Judge Spelman, this was significant
both constitutively and instrumentally. To put it another way, Judge
Spellman believed that opinions should be written in a technically correct
manner by employing the craft of the law as an end in itself, and so that
opinions would enhance a court's capacity to do its socially important
work.
Perhaps even more significantly, Judge Spellman was, in the best
sense of the phrase, a judicial statesman. He was a person who was capa-
ble of grasping a multiplicity of conflicting principles, including some of
which are concerned with the health of the courts as an institution. At
the same time, he related the vision that a judge's duty is not merely to
speak to the law, but also to act on it, to see to it that it becomes reality
and a living truth to those it affects. Thus, unlike the way most of us lead
our lives, by tempering principle with prudence, Judge Spellman reversed
this theme: he tempered prudence with principle. In his opinions, Judge
Spellman always selected his words in a way that would minimize the
confrontation with other branches of government. He clearly under-
stood that major reforms required a coordination of government powers.
He also respected the traditions of law and, thus, followed the principle
of stare decisis; but not in a wooden way. Justice always remained the
overriding goal.
Judge Spellman was equally as much a lawyer as a judicial states-
man. The mastery of the craft of law requires a mixture of the theoreti-
cal and the technical. Judge Spellman was a master of both sets of skills.
He knew the cases, the statutes, and the theories behind them and how
they interacted. He also understood, in a common sense, no frills, unpre-
tentious way, how the legal system worked and how a judge might make
it work better. He put all of these remarkable skills together in dealing
with the very complex issues presented in Jean v. Nelson. He was the
right man at the right time for a most difficult job. We will never forget
him for this rare achievement.
